

Week 3 – Electoral malpractices

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Campaigning

let's play - 2 questions

Campaigning



US candidates visits 2016

Elections and turnout

How can you use turnout information at 2pm to make a very accurate prediction of the results at 8pm?

Comments on assignments

- Paternity uncertainty is key
- Do not mix tenses

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- Survey: not really author's mistake
- Dummy variables vs. continuous variables

Comments on assignments

- Paternity uncertainty is key
- Do not mix tenses
- Survey: not really author's mistake
- Dummy variables vs. continuous variables
- Paternity tests
 - What matters today is the norm
 - Would be key to announce them credibly

Today: Electoral systems and rigging elections

- So far:
 - Origins of political power
 - Origins of social norms
- Next: How is power maintained?¹ How is power legitimized?
- Assumption: those in power want to stay power (see next)
- Focus on democracies
 - Why? It's more subtle, it's where malpractices and grey areas matter.
 - A vast majority of countries have (some sort of) elections

(1) Why do not people overthrow the ruling elites?

Two steps

- Democracies are not neutral
 - Social mobility, political power, etc.
 - Electoral systems & rules have consequences in the absence of malpractices
 - \Rightarrow Understand the impact (mechanism design)
- Democracies are not perfect
 - Electoral malpractices
 - Gray areas (= legal manipulation of rules, policies, etc.)
 - Focus on Singapore

Why in power

Dictatorships / Monarchies	Perks of power	Political parties (Democracies)
	Extortion of producers	
	Psychological gains	
	Policy-making	
	Direct perks from office ¹	
	Pork barreling ²	
	Longer life	

(1) Profit for self and relatives, including \$ (and possibly corruption)

(2) Preferential allocation of goods to political allies or core base support

Why in power

Dictatorships / Monarchies	Perks of power	Political parties (Democracies)
✓	Extortion of producers	
✓	Psychological gains	✓
✓	Policy-making	✓✓
✓✓	Direct perks from office ¹	✓
✓	Pork barreling ²	✓
?	Longer life	✓

(1) Profit for self and relatives, including \$ (and possibly corruption)

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Power

How do elites stay in power? How is it legitimized?

- Dictatorships / Monarchies

- Violence & coercion
- Divinity & social order
- “The common (“national”) goal requires us to be in power”

The Life Of Others (movie), Persepolis (book)

- Democracies

- Sovereignty of the people
- Legitimacy through elections

Democracies

- Presidential system vs. Parliamentary system
- First-past-the-post vs. Proportional Representation



First-past-the-post

► $\approx 1/3$ of total countries



Proportional Representation

► $\approx 2/3$ of total countries

Electoral systems: First-Past-the-Post (FPP) vs. Proportional (PR)

First-Past-the-Post

- Single Member Districts
- Plurality of votes wins district

Proportional

- One district, all tallied together
- % country vote shares \approx % seat shares

Electoral systems: First-Past-the-Post (FPP) vs. Proportional Representation (PR)

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Proportional

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Your task: please some elites

Each group has a task. You can achieve it by deciding:

- Number and boundaries of districts
- Electoral system: Winner-takes-it-all or Proportional
- Number of seats (MPs) that each district elects
- Between 1 and 10 districts

► Map of preferences

Electoral systems: First-Past-the-Post (FPP) vs. Proportional Representation (PR)

First-Past-the-Post

- Single Member Districts
- Plurality of votes wins district

Proportional

- One district, all tallied together
- % country vote shares \approx % seat shares

Consequences for....

- Number of parties?
- Size and stability of governments?
- Representation of minorities?
- (see next)

Electoral systems: First-Past-the-Post (FPP) vs. Proportional (PR)

First-Past-the-Post

- Single Member Districts
- Plurality of votes wins district
- 2/3 parties in Parliament
- Low representativity
- Single-party governments
- Efficacy
- Consequences of vote more certain
- High accountability (MP and gov.) [directly elected]

Proportional

- One district, all tallied together
- % country vote shares \approx % seat shares
- Multiple parties in Parliament
- High representativity
- Coalition governments
- Sluggishness
- Consequences of vote less certain
- Low accountability (MP and gov.) [party lists]

Electoral systems: Differential outcomes

First-Past-the-Post

- (–) Female representation¹
- (–) Corruption²
- (–) Redistribution³
- (–) Transfers⁴
- (+) Public goods⁴
- Turnout?
- Satisfaction?

Proportional

- (+) Female representation
- (+) Corruption
- (+) Redistribution
- (+) Transfers
- (–) Public goods
- Turnout?
- Satisfaction?

(1) Duverger (1955); Norris (1985); Matland and Studlar (1996)

(2) Persson et al. (2003)

(3) Iversen and Soskice (2006); Persson et al. (2007)

(4) Milessi-Ferretti et al. (2002); Lizzeri and Persico (2001)

Bird-eye of malpractices

Before elections

- Gerrymandering
- Malapportionment
- Media
- Costs of entry (parties)
- Costs of voting (US, NZ)
- Libel laws
- Fake news
- Intimidation (candidates)

During elections

- Vote buying
- Ballot stuffing
- Tracing votes
- Intimidation (voters)
- Jailing candidates
- Multiple voting (ink)
- Ballot boxes deletion

After elections

- Results manipulation
- “Floor-crossing”
- Judiciary (FL)

Singapore

- Where does Singapore stand in the Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index? [▶ here](#)
- Does it deserve to be there?
- Let's learn about it

Singapore political system

- Colonized by the UK (20th century)
- *Unwanted* Independence (1965)
- Inherited Westminster system
- Harsh experience in Malaysia (on meritocracy)

Singapore: context in the 1960s


- External
 - Vietnam, Communist China
 - Fear of invasion
- Internal
 - Ethnic riots → “we are all Singaporeans” [▶ here](#)
 - Economy: Need for market + lack of resources

Singapore: goals

- Human capital
- Ethnic peaceful co-habitation
 - HDBs [▶ details here](#)
 - Laws on freedom of speech
 - Air Force?
- \Rightarrow Push for signaling
 - Modernization
 - Security and stability
 - Anti-communism
- Stable, strong government [▶ PAP values](#)

Singapore: electoral system

- FPTP: 79 SMDs (Single Member Districts)
- General Elections 1968, 1972, 1976, 1980: PAP won all seats.



Singapore GRCs

- 2 seats lost in 1984...
- 1988 \Rightarrow **GRC**: Group Representative Constituency. All lists include 2-6 candidates. Closed lists. List with most votes takes all district seats. (75 of 87 seats in 2011)

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 - Safeguarding & shielding of weaker/younger PAP candidates
 - Harder for the opposition to coordinate
 - Locally successful opposition candidates \Rightarrow harder time winning

Singapore GRCs

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- 1988 \Rightarrow **GRC**: Group Representative Constituency. All lists include 2-6 candidates. Closed lists. List with most votes takes all district seats. (75 of 87 seats in 2011)
 - Safeguarding & shielding of weaker/younger PAP candidates
 - Harder for the opposition to coordinate
 - Locally successful opposition candidates \Rightarrow harder time winning
- Important! We cannot prove causality

Singapore: other particularities

- Electoral Commission [▶ details](#)
- Pork barreling [▶ details](#)
- Fear of voting for the opposition [▶ details](#)
- Libel laws
- Costs of entry

Singapore: voting under fear?

- Lee Kuan Yew interview April 12, 2006: 10,29" — 13.05"
- Origins of the urban myth [▶ details](#)
- Some evidence [▶ details](#)
- How to learn more [▶ details](#)
- Consequences [▶ details](#)
- What about other countries? [▶ details](#)

Takeaways

- There are many motivations for being in power
- Electoral systems have consequences
- Electoral manipulation is a gray area: usually legal, rarely legitimate
- Many aspects can stack the playing field against particular agents

For today

- Take your country
- What does it excel on in electoral integrity? Why do you think that is the case ? (origins, context)
- What does it fail in electoral integrity? Why do you think that is the case ? (origins, context)

For today

- Example: Spain

For today

- Example: Spain
 - Excels: election day cleanliness
 - Malpractices are usually military
 - Many observers from all parties
 - Citizens chosen by lottery
 - Fails: independence of the judiciary
 - Inherited from the Dictatorship era
 - Rules, norms, promotion from that time still prevail


For Monday

- Example: Spain (cont'd)
 - Excels: promoting turnout
 - Elections are on Sunday, publicly owned buildings
 - BUT: cannot vote anywhere
 - Excels: Media time
 - Election campaign: time on TV News predetermined by share of past votes (to the second!)
 - Why: remember Civil Law

For Monday

- Just ok lah: Malapportionment
 - Lower Chamber (Congress)
 - Barcelona: 5.6M inhabitants, 32 MPs. \Rightarrow 175,281
 - Soria: 88,600 inhabitants, 2 MPs \Rightarrow 44,150
 - Ratio \approx 4
 - Upper Chamber (Senate)
 - Barcelona: 5.6M inhabitants, 4 MSs. \Rightarrow 1,402,250
 - Soria: 88,600 inhabitants, 4 MSs \Rightarrow 22,075
 - Ratio: 63.52
 - Goal: tilt the playing field in favor of rural areas (more heavily linked to the previous dictator)

Your task: please some elites




Each square is 10,000 voters

Approximately you have 65%
blue, 30% red, 5% yellow

Your goal: ***ALL*** seats in
parliament to be blue

► back to slides

Your task: please some elites




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Approximately you have 65%
blue, 30% red, 5% yellow

Your goal: 90% of seats in
parliament to be blue

Your task: please some elites




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Approximately you have 65%
blue, 30% red, 5% yellow

Your goal: make sure there is
a stable government

Your task: please some elites




Each square is 10,000 voters

Approximately you have 65%
blue, 30% red, 5% yellow

Your goal: you want a
majority of seats to be red

Your task: please some elites



Each square is 10,000 voters


Approximately you have 65% blue, 30% red, 5% yellow

Your goal: you want at least two thirds of seats to be red

► One possible solution

► One possible solution

Your task: please some elites




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Approximately you have 65%
blue, 30% red, 5% yellow

Your goal: you want the
yellows to be pivotal in all
votes in Parliament

► One possible solution

Your task: please some elites



Each square is 10,000 voters


Approximately you have 65%
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Your goal: you want yellows
not to have any
representation at all

► One possible solution

► back to slides

One possible solution



Each square is 10,000 voters


Approximately you have 65% blue, 30% red, 5% yellow

Your goal: you want at least two thirds of seats to be red

Proportional system, but each district elects a different number of MPs (e.g., 5, 10 and 20)

► back to slides

Another possible solution




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Approximately you have 65% blue, 30% red, 5% yellow

Your goal: you want at least two thirds of seats to be red

► back to slides

Your task: please some elites




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► back to slides

Your task: please some elites



Each square is 10,000 voters

Approximately you have 65% blue, 30% red, 5% yellow

Your goal: you want yellows not to have any representation at all

► back to slides

Electoral systems: Some examples

First-Past-the-Post

- UK
- Canada
- Malaysia
- India
- Singapore
- $\approx 1/3$ of total countries

Proportional

- Germany
- Israel
- Netherlands
- Iceland
- Spain
- $\approx 2/3$ of total countries

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Table 2
Democracy Index 2019

	Overall Score	Rank	Electoral process and pluralism	Functioning of government	Political participation	Political culture	Civil liberties
Full democracy							
Norway	9.87	1	10.00	9.64	10.00	10.00	9.71
Iceland	9.58	2	10.00	9.29	8.89	10.00	9.71
Sweden	9.39	3	9.58	9.64	8.33	10.00	9.41
New Zealand	9.26	4	10.00	9.29	8.89	8.13	10.00
Finland	9.25	5	10.00	8.93	8.89	8.75	9.71
Ireland	9.24	6	10.00	7.86	8.33	10.00	10.00
Denmark	9.22	7=	10.00	9.29	8.33	9.38	9.12
Canada	9.22	7=	9.58	9.64	7.78	9.38	9.71
Australia	9.09	9	10.00	8.93	7.78	8.75	10.00
Switzerland	9.03	10	9.58	9.29	7.78	9.38	9.12
Netherlands	9.01	11	9.58	9.29	8.33	8.75	9.12
Paraguay	6.24	70	8.75	5.71	5.00	4.38	7.35
El Salvador	6.15	71=	9.17	4.64	6.11	3.75	7.06
Guyana	6.15	71=	6.92	5.36	6.11	5.00	7.35
Mexico	6.09	73	7.83	6.07	7.22	3.13	6.18
Papua New Guinea	6.03	74	6.92	6.07	3.89	5.63	7.65
Hong Kong	6.02	75=	3.58	4.36	6.11	7.50	8.53
Singapore	6.02	75=	3.92	7.86	5.00	6.25	7.06

Democracy Index 2019

	Overall Score	Rank	Electoral process and pluralism	Functioning of government	Political participation	Political culture	Civil liberties
Hybrid regime							
North Macedonia	5.97	77	7.00	5.36	6.67	3.75	7.06
Ukraine	5.90	78	7.42	2.71	6.67	6.25	6.47
Albania	5.89	79	7.00	5.36	4.44	5.00	7.65
Bangladesh	5.88	80	7.83	6.07	6.11	4.38	5.00

Since 2006

Table 3
Democracy Index 2006-19

	2019	2018	2017	2016	2015	2014	2013	2012	2011	2010	2008	2006
Afghanistan	2.85	2.97	2.55	2.55	2.77	2.77	2.48	2.48	2.48	2.48	3.02	3.06
Australia	9.09	9.09	9.09	9.01	9.01	9.01	9.13	9.22	9.22	9.22	9.09	9.09
Bangladesh	5.88	5.57	5.43	5.73	5.73	5.78	5.86	5.86	5.86	5.87	5.52	6.11
Bhutan	5.30	5.30	5.08	4.93	4.93	4.87	4.82	4.65	4.57	4.68	4.30	2.62
Cambodia	3.53	3.59	3.63	4.27	4.27	4.78	4.60	4.96	4.87	4.87	4.87	4.77
China	2.26	3.32	3.10	3.14	3.14	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.14	3.14	3.04	2.97
Fiji	5.85	5.85	5.85	5.64	5.69	5.61	3.61	3.67	3.67	3.62	5.11	5.66
Hong Kong	6.02	6.15	6.31	6.42	6.50	6.46	6.42	6.42	5.92	5.92	5.85	6.03
India	6.90	7.23	7.23	7.81	7.74	7.92	7.69	7.52	7.30	7.28	7.80	7.68
Indonesia	6.48	6.39	6.39	6.97	7.03	6.95	6.82	6.76	6.53	6.53	6.34	6.41
Japan	7.99	7.99	7.88	7.99	7.96	8.08	8.08	8.08	8.08	8.08	8.25	8.15
Laos	2.14	2.37	2.37	2.37	2.21	2.21	2.21	2.32	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.10
Malaysia	7.16	6.88	6.54	6.54	6.43	6.49	6.49	6.41	6.19	6.19	6.36	5.98
Mongolia	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.62	6.62	6.62	6.51	6.35	6.23	6.36	6.60	6.60
Myanmar	3.55	3.83	3.83	4.20	4.14	3.05	2.76	2.35	1.77	1.77	1.77	1.77
Nepal	5.28	5.18	5.18	4.86	4.77	4.77	4.77	4.16	4.24	4.24	4.05	3.42
New Zealand	9.26	9.26	9.26	9.26	9.26	9.26	9.26	9.26	9.26	9.26	9.19	9.01
North Korea	1.08	1.08	1.08	1.08	1.08	1.08	1.08	1.08	1.08	1.08	0.86	1.03
Pakistan	4.25	4.17	4.26	4.33	4.40	4.64	4.64	4.57	4.55	4.55	4.46	3.92
Papua New Guinea	6.03	6.03	6.03	6.03	6.03	6.03	6.36	6.32	6.32	6.54	6.54	6.54
Philippines	6.64	6.71	6.71	6.94	6.84	6.77	6.41	6.30	6.12	6.12	6.12	6.48
Singapore	6.02	6.38	6.32	6.38	6.14	6.03	5.92	5.88	5.89	5.89	5.89	5.89
South Korea	8.00	8.00	8.00	7.92	7.97	8.06	8.06	8.13	8.06	8.11	8.01	7.88

Asia and Australasia

Table 6
Asia and Australasia 2019

	Overall score	Global Rank	Regional rank	I Electoral process and pluralism	II Functioning of government	III Political participation	IV Political culture	V Civil liberties	Regime type
New Zealand	9.26	4	1	10.00	9.29	8.89	8.13	10.00	Full democracy
Australia	9.09	9	2	10.00	8.93	7.78	8.75	10.00	Full democracy
South Korea	8.00	23	3	9.17	7.86	7.22	7.50	8.24	Flawed democracy
Japan	7.99	24	4	8.75	8.21	6.67	7.50	8.82	Flawed democracy
Taiwan	7.73	31	5	9.58	8.21	6.11	5.63	9.12	Flawed democracy
Timor-Leste	7.19	41	6	9.58	6.29	5.56	6.88	7.65	Flawed democracy
Malaysia	7.16	43=	7	9.17	7.86	6.67	6.25	5.88	Flawed democracy
India	6.90	51	8	8.67	6.79	6.67	5.63	6.76	Flawed democracy
Philippines	6.64	54	9	9.17	5.36	7.22	4.38	7.06	Flawed democracy
Mongolia	6.50	62	10	9.17	5.71	5.56	5.00	7.06	Flawed democracy
Indonesia	6.48	64	11	7.92	7.14	6.11	5.63	5.59	Flawed democracy
Thailand	6.32	68	12	7.42	5.36	6.11	6.25	6.47	Flawed democracy
Sri Lanka	6.27	69	13	7.00	6.07	5.56	6.25	6.47	Flawed democracy
Papua New Guinea	6.03	74	14	6.92	6.07	3.89	5.63	7.65	Flawed democracy
Hong Kong	6.02	75=	15=	3.58	4.36	6.11	7.50	8.53	Flawed democracy
Singapore	6.02	75=	15=	3.92	7.86	5.00	6.25	7.06	Flawed democracy
Bangladesh	5.88	80	17	7.83	6.07	6.11	4.38	5.00	Hybrid regime
Fiji	5.85	81	18	6.58	5.36	6.11	5.63	5.59	Hybrid regime
Bhutan	5.30	91	19	8.75	6.79	2.78	4.38	3.82	Hybrid regime
Nepal	5.28	92	20	4.83	5.36	5.00	5.63	5.59	Hybrid regime
Pakistan	4.25	108	21	6.08	5.71	2.22	2.50	4.71	Hybrid regime
Myanmar	3.55	122=	22	3.08	3.93	2.78	5.63	2.35	Authoritarian
Cambodia	3.53	124	23	0.83	4.64	3.33	5.63	3.24	Authoritarian
Vietnam	3.08	136	24	0.00	3.21	3.89	5.63	2.65	Authoritarian
Afghanistan	2.85	141=	25	3.42	0.64	3.89	2.50	3.82	Authoritarian
China	2.26	153	26	0.00	4.29	3.33	2.50	1.18	Authoritarian
Laos	2.14	155	27	0.00	2.86	1.67	5.00	1.18	Authoritarian
North Korea	1.08	167	28	0.00	2.50	1.67	1.25	0.00	Authoritarian

Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit.


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Singapore in the 1960s



Singapore in the 1960s



Source: Tan, Netina, 2012: "Constitutional Engineering and Regulation Ethnic Politics in Singapore" (unpublished manuscript)

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Public Housing (HDB)

- Goals
 - Subsidized and modernized housing
 - Balanced Mix of Different Ethnic Groups
 - 1989: Ethnic Integration Policy. Maximum quotas per housing block ([currently, check here](#))
 - 87% Chinese
 - 15% Malays
 - 10% Indian or Other
 - (\pm 3% per housing estate)
- 1965: 25% lived in such buildings
- 1990s onwards: 85%

Public Housing (HDB)

- Consequence (intended or not)

Public Housing (HDB)

- Consequence (intended or not)
- Uniform distribution of (ethnic) preferences
- Massimo Morelli, *Review of Economic Studies*, 2003: “Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems”
 - If policy preferences similar across districts Number of effective parties smaller in FPTP than in Proportional System
 - If policy preferences are asymmetric across districts, then there may be more parties under FPTP.
- \Rightarrow Perfect recipe for strong “cater-for-all” party
- (In particular, no ethnic politics can trigger success)

▶ back to slides

Singapore values

- State over the family over the individual. Individual and political rights slightly less valued than in Western Democracies.
- (PAP) Elitism and uncompromising meritocracy
- No concept of representation: an elected member is not in Parliament to represent her electorate, but to use her authority to act on behalf of the nation.
- “[once democratically elected], the concern of government is not to give further expression to the ideals of democracy, but to be seen to govern” (p.212)

Hwee, Yeo Lay. “Electoral politics in Singapore.” *Electoral politics in southeast and east Asia*, 203 (2002): 217. [▶ back to slides](#)

New Zealand: Electoral Commission

- Independent body
- Responds to the Parliament
- Very strict & transparent rules and procedures
 - \Rightarrow No Malapportionment
 - \Rightarrow No Gerrymandering

New Zealand: Electoral Commission

- Governor-General appoints and removes Electoral Commissioners on the recommendation of the House of Representatives
- Independent Crown entity. The responsible Minister may not direct the Commission to give effect to, or have regard to, government policy.
- Representation Commission (Election Boundaries)
 - The Chairperson, appointed by the Governor-General following nomination by the members of the Commission;
 - Four ex officio members (the Surveyor-General, Government Statistician, Chief Electoral Officer, and Chairperson of the Local Government Commission); and
 - Two members **representing the Government and the Opposition**, appointed by the Governor-General following nomination by the House of Representatives; and
 - The Chief Executive of Te Puni Kkiri; and
 - Two people of Mori descent who **represent the Government and the Opposition**, appointed by the Governor-General following nomination by the House of Representatives.

New Zealand: No Malapportionment

- By Law: 16 districts in the South Island. This determines the electoral quota
- Number of districts in the North Island depends on the electoral quota
- Maximal deviation allowed: $\pm 5\%$ from quota

New Zealand: Maximum Transparency

Electoral Commission Q&A [here](#)

- The public can make objections and counter-objections to the proposed names and boundaries as part of the Representation Commission's public consultation process.

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- The public then has two weeks to make counter-objections to any objection received for the proposed boundaries.
- The Representation Commission meets to hear the objections and counter-objections before making final decisions.
- Final electoral boundaries: The Representation Commission produces its final report on the names and boundaries of electorates after considering any objections and counter-objections. The Commission publishes a notice, stating that it has determined the electorate names and boundaries and where this information can be found. These become the electorates for general elections until the Commission reviews them again.

2007 Representation Commission Report (NZ)

objection forms for the public to follow. The Commission received 331 objections including 57 objections to proposed names. There were 114 counter-objections to the proposed boundaries released on 3 May 2007. That number was greater when

N08

Te Atatu

N08	001	<i>n</i>	Objection	G R Seymour	Allowed
			Objects to the omission of a macron in the name of the proposed Te Atatu electorate.		
			<i>Suggested solution</i> That the electorate name be spelt 'Te Atatū'		

2007 Representation Commission Report (NZ)

N09

Waitakere

N09	001	<i>b</i>	Objection	B L Pillay, MP – Waitakere	Allowed
			<p>Objects to the inclusion of Muriwai in the proposed Waitakere electorate. Muriwai is isolated by topography and transport facilities from the rest of the electorate and is part of the Rodney District, rather than Waitakere City.</p> <p><i>Suggested solution</i> Do not include Muriwai in the Waitakere electorate.</p>		
N09	002	<i>b</i>	Objection	Hon Chris Carter, MP – Te Atatu	Disallowed. Quota tolerance does not permit the proposed change
			<p>Objects to the inclusion of the northern part of the suburb of Sunnyvale in the proposed Waitakere electorate. This suburb shares a community of interest with Henderson and the Te Atatu electorate.</p> <p><i>Suggested solution</i> Run the boundary with the Te Atatu electorate along Railside Avenue, View Road, James Laurie Street, and along Great Northern Road to the boundary with Sabulite Road.</p>		

2007 Representation Commission Report (NZ)

N10

New Lynn

N10

001

n

Objection

B R Costley

Disallowed

Objects to the name 'New Lynn' for the proposed electorate as the New Lynn area is no longer central to the electorate.

Suggested solution Name the electorate ‘Titirangi’

N17

052

b

Objection

S M Schollum

Allowed

Objects to the inclusion of the area north of Point England Road in the proposed Pakuranga electorate as this leaves only one narrow road link for the area included in the proposed Tamaki electorate with the southern half of its electorate.

Suggested solution Move the proposed boundary of West Tamaki Road south to Point England Road. This would also reunite the suburbs of Glen Innes and St Johns, which share a community of interest. To compensate for the increased population, Ellerslie could be placed in the Maungakiekie electorate.

2007 Representation Commission Report (NZ)

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
South Island

The Act requires that there be 16 general electorates in the South Island. The Commission adopted the view of previous Commissions that the Southern Alps provide the most significant natural barrier and thus have a strong influence on the shape and extent of electoral boundaries in the South Island. When considering the proposed **West Coast-Tasman** electoral district, the Commission formed the view that the already very large geographical extent of the electoral district justified the retention as far as possible of the existing boundary with a population below the quota tolerance. The population is projected to continue to decline relative to the quota and some adjustment to the boundary was necessary. The northern boundary was therefore adjusted to move closer to the Nelson area between Wakefield and Brightwater. This proposal attracted 14 objections including a petition of 538 signatures. The Commission partially met most of the objections to the extent that Wakefield is re-united with its neighbouring towns of Foxhill and Belgrove, but because of the quota requirement, the Commission was unable to include these areas in the **Nelson** electorate where the objectors wished to be.

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Singapore Map of Electoral Districts 2011

SINGAPORE PARLIAMENTARY GENERAL ELECTIONS 2011 ELECTORAL DIVISION MAP



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Singapore: serial IDs

- Ballot boxes → sealed after elections
- Supreme court, behind locked doors
- Only a judge can request an opening
- Burned 6 months later with witnesses
- *Everyone (incumbent and opposition)* states votes are secret.

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Placebo Statements in LE

		Control		<i>p</i> -value
		Standard	Placebo	
Whole sample		1.76 (719)	1.84 (432)	0.0624
Political knowledge	Low	1.77 (458)	1.90 (263)	0.0393
	High	1.75 (259)	1.76 (169)	0.4449
Education	None or primary	1.48 (97)	2.07 (46)	0.0007
	Secondary	1.86 (186)	1.95 (111)	0.2095
	Post-secondary	1.78 (423)	1.77 (262)	0.5459
Household income	< \$3.5K per month	1.76 (261)	1.96 (162)	0.0251
	≥ \$3.5K per month	1.81 (378)	1.79 (228)	0.5914
Age	61+	1.56 (144)	1.86 (82)	0.0124
	21 – 60	1.80 (562)	1.84 (346)	0.2680

Ahlquist et al (2014): 6% of Americans “have been abducted by aliens”

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Motivation

- Singapore ballots: individual, non-transferable ID
- Official reason: prevent ballot stuffing, fraud, impersonation
- \Rightarrow Urban legend: concerns for *individual vote tracking*
- Government influence
 - Public housing (80%)
 - Mandatory public pension scheme
 - Mandatory National Service
 - Public schooling only
 - Public servants (14%)
 - CCTVs internalized as part of the landscape
 - Collective punishments *do exist* (HDB upgrades or lack thereof)
 - \Rightarrow *Perceived* incentives to vote for the PAP

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- Votes are secret [▶ Details](#)
- Disclaimer: I would bet all my savings votes are not tracked

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Some Evidence

- One week before the 2015 General Election
- SDP FB page: [Your Vote IS Secret](#)
- [Is My Vote Really Secret? Vote Wisely. Vote Without Fear. The Vote is Secret.](#)
- [The Online Citizen](#) also share the video
- [MARUAH Executive Report](#)
- March 2, 2017, Opposition MP, [Leon Perera, FB Page](#): “Our votes in elections are secret and can never be traced - no ifs, no buts. So why does the government not want to expose new citizens to ballot secrecy education, as I suggested today in Parliament? (...) Last year, I asked in Parliament if the process behind ballot secrecy could be taught in schools. The answer was another no, on the grounds of “limited curriculum time”

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List experiment

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Comment

- Results seem large
- Potential confounding effects with
 - Tracking at block level
 - Careless reading (*satisficing*) [▶ details](#)
 - Opposition sentiment (spite against PAP)
- \Rightarrow Direct questioning

Direct questioning: results

Direct questioning: results

	% 'Yes'	% non-response
Do you believe that individual votes are traced?	29.9%	9.9%
Do you believe that the government punishes individuals that vote for the opposition?	15.6%	19.7%
Have you ever changed your vote because you fear the authorities will penalise you or your family? ⁽¹⁾	9.3%	15.2%
Observations	416	

(1) Only Singaporeans \geq 23 years old

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 - USA, 25% (Gerber et al., 2012)
 - Africa: Malawi, 13% – Nigeria 46% (Ferree and Long, 2016)
 - Latin America: Guatemala 10% – Honduras 52% (Kiewiet de Jonge and Nickerson, 2014)

Summary

- Votes are tracked: 30 – 47%
 - USA, 25% (Gerber et al., 2012)
 - Africa: Malawi, 13% – Nigeria 46% (Ferree and Long, 2016)
 - Latin America: Guatemala 10% – Honduras 52% (Kiewiet de Jonge and Nickerson, 2014)
- Vote switching ‘out of concerns’: 8 – 29%
 - USA: effects only for union members

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Afterthoughts

- Incumbent: persistent refusal to address the issue
- Intentional or not, subtle nudge in the absence of violence and blunt interventions can have sizeable effects in otherwise peaceful societies
- In equilibrium, *if pivotal*, would citizens really vote for the opposition?
- What was the opposition signaling until 2011?

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Singapore: upgrading carrot

- Lee Kuan Yew interview April 12, 2006: 8.08” — 10.02”
- Muralidharan Pillai (PAP), Bukit Batok election (2015):
“This plan that we are presenting is part of the PAP Jurong Town Council. If we don’t have the mandate then we don’t have the ability to carry on, because we wouldn’t form the town council”
- 1992 by-election: Goh Chok Tong “to upgrade or not is all up to residents. If they voted for me and my team, I will have the mandate to give them the upgrading”
- 1997: becomes official policy (+ tally votes at building level)

► images

- Data not available

Read more [in this 2016 article](#)

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Singapore: Electoral Commission

- Elections Department directly supervised by the PM's Office. Headed by a civil servant.
- Before elections: PM appoints an Electoral Boundaries Review Committee. Its report and recommendations need only be approved by the government. *They are not submitted for Parliament debate or approval.*
- Boundaries may be redrawn until up to only 9 days before the elections.
 - 1958 report: 42 pages.
 - 2006 report: 7 pages. Explanation for boundary changes: “[they are a reflection] of current configurations and population changes since the last boundary delineation exercise” (Tan, 2012, p. 13).

Singapore: Electoral Commission

Table 4: Minority Opposition Candidates and Dissolved Single Member Constituencies After 1984

Party	Candidate	Vote Share %	Race	SMD in 1984	Changes after 1988 GE
WP	John Cruz Corera	33.2	Eurasian	Alexandra	Remained
WP	Joshua Benjamin Jeyaretnam	56.8	Indian	Anson	Split into Tanjong Pagar, Kreta Ayer GRCs
JPS	Suib Bin Abdul Rahman	24.6	Malay	Ayer Rajah	Remained
UPF	Shaikh Ahmad B. S. Salim	25.3	Malay	Bo Wen	Disappeared
SUF	Reveendran Sasi	30.4	Indian	Boon Lay	Remained
WP	Mohd Taib Bin Saffar	33.7	Malay	Brickworks	Brickworks GRC
SUF	Mohamed Mansor B. A. Rahman	34.4	Malay	Geylang Serai	Marine Parade GRC
WP	Madai Puthan D. Nair	48.8	Indian	Jalan Kayu	Cheng San GRC
WP	Balakrishnan Ananthan	35.6	Indian	Jalan Besar	Jalan Besar GRC
WP	A. L. Sundram	35.1	Indian	Kallang	Remained
WP	Mohamed Jufrie B. Mahmood	44.3	Malay	Kampong Kembangan	Aljunied GRC
PKMS	Abdul Rahman B. Mohamed Zin	36.3	Malay	Kampong Ubi	Aljunied GRC
UPF	Harbans Singh	24.2	Indian	Kebun Baru	Remained
WP	Royston George Scharenguivel	42.1	Eurasian	Kolam Ayer	Jalan Besar GRC
WP	George Benjamin Armstrong	33.2	Eurasian	Leng Kee	Remained
SUF	Gertrude Magdeline De Gracias	29.1	Eurasian	Marine Parade	Marine Parade GRC
Ind	Stanley MARIADASS	22.6	Indian	Sembawang	Sembawang GRC
UPF	Kasim Bin Ibrahim	27.7	Malay	Tampines	Tampines GRC
WP	Murugason Rajaratnam	45.0	Indian	Telok Blangah	Remained
UPF	Munjeet Singh	23.3	Indian	Yio Chu Kang	Remained

Source: Data from Singapore Elections.

*Bold: Candidates with more than 35 percent vote share.

Source: Netina Tan, 2012, “Constitutional Engineering and Regulating Ethnic Politics in Singapore”

Singapore: Electoral Commission

- Most of GRCs with more than 40% of vote for opposition \Rightarrow redistribution into larger neighbouring GRCs
- Some highly contested SMCs have disappeared
- Evidence is not causal, but very suggestive
- ▶ 2011 Electoral Map

Netina Tan: "Constitutional Engineering and Regulating Ethnic Politics in Singapore" (2012) Link [here](#).

Singapore: Electoral Commission

- What can be done to improve this?

- ▶ Let's compare it to New Zealand

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