Do Citizens Vote for Parties, Policies or the Expected Winner in Proportional Representation Systems?
Evidence from Four Different Countries Using a Multiple Types Model

This paper presents a unified framework that allows us to disentangle to what extent agents in proportional representation systems
engage in the different strategies that the available voting models have separately suggested: party-, coalition-, bandwagon- and `other'- voting.
Results using data from multiple countries reveal that at least around 75\% of agents cast a sincere party vote. Around 10\% of them try to affect
policy making by casting a coalitional vote. Coalitional voting seems to be directional: voters use it to `push' coalitions away from the center.
Hence, extreme parties are the ones who benefit most from it. Another 5\% of voters support the expected winner regardless of their own party and coalition preferences.
Finally, consistently across countries, 5\% to 10\% of voters fall into the category of `other' types -i.e. they use strategies that our current models
cannot rationalize. The socioeconomic characteristics and political attitudes of each type of voter are uncovered. Two patterns emerge:
$(i)$ sophisticated voters engage relatively more in both party and coalitional voting and
$(ii)$ dissatisfaction with parties voted for in the past leads agents into casting an `other' type vote irrespective of their degree of sophistication.

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